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 a. Theology vs. religious studies 
 
In the current issue of the Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Peter Ochs argues 
that the debate about ‘religious studies versus theology’ is a symptom of a crisis of a different 
order: ‘the still unresolved relation of the western academy to the civilizations it ought to 
serve, (…) [and to] religious traditions in particular’.2 Ochs characterizes this relation as 
‘colonialism writ small’: the academy shows an unselfconscious tendency to act as if its 
categories and propositions, bound to a particular context and point of view, are part of the 
(religious) realities we deal with. In fact, we are imposing them on these realities. Both 
theology and religious studies, according to Ochs, manifest this tendency. 
 
The current academic view on theology is a particular case of this ‘colonialism writ small’. 
Theology is seen as the study of one particular religion while religious studies covers all 
religions and the idea of religion in general. Furthermore, it is seen as the study of a religious 
tradition from the inside, adopting and applying the normative viewpoints of the religious 
tradition it studies, while religious studies are regarded as the study of religion from the 
outside without a normative or doctrinal bias. The consequence of these distinctions between 
theology and religious studies is that the field of religious studies and its separation of facts 
and norms has adapted to academia’s demands and is as such the true heir of theology in a 
post-Christian and post-colonial situation.  
 
Against this idea we would like to propose that theology is not a biased form of religious 
studies, because it is not a form of religious studies at all. Theology does not have religion as 
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its object, at least not – following a distinction made by Thomas Aquinas – as its material 
object. Instead of religion, theology studies the whole of reality from the viewpoint of a 
religious adherence to God. In other words, theology is substantially informed by the history 
and practices of particular religious traditions. This entails that religious traditions must be 
studied, as they are in religious studies, but theology’s aim is to rationally articulate the 
presence of the God and gods these traditions address, trying to reflect on how this presence 
addresses itself to people. This is the important contribution theology could make to 
contemporary post-Christian, multi-cultural and multi-religious society. It is not a form of 
religious colonialism of reality, because theology, as an academic discipline, is part of the 
university, and therefore of the broader cultural, societal and political debates about who we 
are, where we are and where we are and should be going.  
 
In this paper we would like to articulate this role of theology in the world, not only by 
defending our thesis in general, but also by illustrating it with an example from a research 
project at the Heyendaal Institute for interdisciplinary research, in Nijmegen, the Netherlands. 
At this institute, we have been developing research on the interfaces of theology and other 
clusters of academic disciplines. Today we will give the example of theology and the medical 
sciences. Its aim is not to develop a theology of medicine, but to find theology in medicine by 
locating religious views, and recognising and furthering theological discussions in medical 
practice and the medical sciences.  
 
 b. We are such stuff that doctrines are made on: world and memory 
 
If theology differs from the study of religion and is regarded as the study of reality as a whole 
in view of a particular religious tradition, then the question arises how to speak theologically 
about reality, life, the world, power and politics, the human person, etc. Does theology 
articulate a specific religious viewpoint in communication with others, or does it rationally 
(re-)construct one through the recognition of a singularity or unicity amidst shared views and 
common interests? These questions are far more urgent than the issue of what can be regarded 
as specifically theological. In our opinion, theologians could be less concerned with the 
demarcation of their field of study or the identity of their own tradition, and more with the 
world from which their ideas originate and to which they return them. This does not entail an 
abdication of theology or more specifically of Christian doctrine. On the contrary, we would 
like to argue that an engagement with the world has been the core interest of Christian 
doctrine, and it is through this engagement that theology is expected to find its incarnational 
authenticity.3 It is this incarnational approach we would like to explore. 
 
According to David Tracy’s definition of systematic theology, it has as its ‘major concern the 
re-presentation, the reinterpretation of what is assumed to be the ever-present disclosive and 
transformative power of the particular religious tradition to which the theologian belongs’.4 
Similarly, Gavin D’Costa has argued for the place of theology within the university as a 
tradition-specific form of intellectual enquiry.5 But the particularity or specificity of a 
religious tradition emerges and changes through its ongoing relationship with God, the world 
that according to the Psalmist is God’s, including the people with different world views that 
live in it (Psalm 24: 1). Consequently, questions as to what defines tradition or how to 
distinguish between an insider’s and outsider’s point of view are continuously at stake in 
theology. 
 
Theology should therefore be more than the intellectual articulation of a specific religious 
tradition from an insider’s point of view, or its proclamation (Ricoeur/Tracy). Instead, it 
should also accommodate the reflection on emerging doctrines of faith, both inside and 
outside a particular religious tradition. Not only to critically enter into dialogue with different 
doctrines in order to respectfully and peacefully coexist in this world with others, but also to 
acknowledge that the truth dwells in all that is and that this is a given which reveals itself 
when particularities or individualities have lost their self-evidence, are violated, or appear to 
be insufficient in themselves. 
 
To be able to critically recognize and reflect upon such a revelation, fundamental questions 
concerning methods and sources will continue to be on the theological agenda. Not because 
the list of sources – scripture, tradition, contemporary culture, experience – is as yet 
incomplete or needs to be updated. Not because theological methods are insufficiently 
accounted for, or incompatible with other academic disciplines. But to seek an understanding 
of the paradoxical fact that there is no set of ideas or doctrinal system that could be presented 
as a strictly demarcated insider’s point of view, while no meaning or value is without a 
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specific history but bears the identifiable memory of others. Not the history of religion or an 
a-theological type of religious studies, but theology is the vital intellectual participation in that 
process of memory and representation, because it originates in and furthers the commitment 
with the stuff that religious doctrines are made on. 
 
 c. Finding Faith in Medicine 
 
To illustrate theology’s engagement with the world and the memory of meaning, we would 
like to present an exemplary case. The example comes from current theological research into 
the relationship between religion and medicine, aiming to rediscover, rephrase and reconsider 
Christian doctrine within the realm of medical practice.  
 
How to study the relationship between religious faith and medicine? The number of academic 
publications on the subject has grown exponentially in recent years. A selection of searches in 
the medical science database Pubmed/Medline on query combinations such as ‘spirituality 
and health’ or ‘religion and health’, returns thousands of publications, mainly from the last 
decade.6 The scholars performing these research projects are mainly medical anthropologists 
and psychologists, who in general do not work within faculties of theology or religious 
studies.7  
 
The overall characteristic in current (mainly Anglo-American) research in religion and 
medicine is the instrumental approach of religion in relation to medicine. The main approach 
of religion and medicine is descriptive, the main focus is functional: where and how do people 
rely on religious ideas and religious practices in medicine, and what is their contribution to 
the process of curing or coping with what is incurable.8 
 
Stanley Hauerwas has argued that any account of salvation necessarily includes questions of 
health, illness and disease, but according to him that does not imply that medicine can or ever 
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should become the agency of salvation. He blames church and theology for failing to locate 
wherein salvation lies: in the sanctification of communal compassion for the sufferers, which 
is not defined by the will to survive, but by the ‘the truthful resignation to the givenness of life 
in the presence of God’. The consequence has been that according to Hauerwas many today 
seek an individual salvation through medicine.9  
 
Hauerwas might be right in expressing his concerns about medicine itself becoming a salvific 
faith in contemporary culture by making claims about salvation that differ radically from 
Christian faith. The consequence however of that observation would be a strict divide 
between theology and religious studies, or it would at least lead to a critical role of theology 
over against religious studies. Theology in Hauerwas’ case critically approves of, but mostly 
dismisses, the situation that religious studies can only observe and describe. As if theology is 
not part of the religion religious studies study, and religious studies are not part of the reality 
theology views sub ratione Dei. 
 
A different approach to the study of faith and medicine could profit from the insights of 
sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920). According to him, to understand doctrines of salvation 
one should analyse the ways societies respond to suffering. He placed such emphasis on the 
importance of suffering to a culture that he considered the whole character and style of 
different societies to be determined by their religious understanding of suffering, by what he 
calls their ‘theodicies’. In his view, religions offer theodicies not simply as abstract solutions 
to intellectual puzzles, but as programs for action, or as substitutes for it.10 
 
Weber used the term ‘theodicy’ in a much broader sense than is usual. He did not confine his 
understanding of theodicy to the classical problem of how suffering can exist in the world if 
God is both omnipotent and all-loving, although he knew that this problem has been an 
important part of the human struggle to find a meaning for existence. Instead, he used the 
concept of theodicy to refer more extensively to the ways in which religions interpret the 
many inequalities that all people observe and also to the ways in which, based on those 
interpretations, religions create and legitimise different forms of society. In his Sociology of 
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Religion, Weber first described the classical issue: ‘the more the development tends toward 
the conception of a transcendental unitary God who is universal, the more there arises the 
problem of how the extraordinary power of such a god may be reconciled with the 
imperfection of the world that he has created and rules over.’  
 
According to Weber, the human experience of inequalities is the problem factor that 
determines religious evolution and the need for salvation. He showed that the modern 
rejection of the god-idea was not motivated by scientific arguments, but by the difficulty in 
reconciling the idea of providence with the injustice and imperfection of the social order. In 
Weber’s argument, all people experience great inequalities, which carry with them much 
suffering, unequally distributed: you are wise, I am foolish, you are well, I am sick, you are 
rich, I am poor. Why are these things as they are? Religions pour explanation and meaning 
(i.e. theodicies) into these gaps of commonplace experience, and these theodicies create very 
different forms of society and of social behaviour. From the adopted theodicy of a particular 
religion flow social consequences that give their characteristic form and actions (or lack of 
actions) to society.  
 
Therefore, the question what theodicy is, is of central importance, because theodicies are 
embodied in current medical practices and forms of health care and have great consequences 
medical decision-making. Weber’s case proves that any understanding or reformulation of the 
origins and motives of medicine and public health is primarily an exercise in understanding 
implicit and explicit theological views in contemporary culture and society. 
 
 d. Theological rationality and publicness 
 
Peter Ochs argued that ‘scholars of religious studies or theology practice a kind of 
“colonialism writ small” when they remove their subject matter from its lived, societal 
contexts and re-situate it in conceptual worlds of their own devising’.11 Using the example of 
medicine, we have tried to relate religious faith and doctrines to the world in which they 
emerge by tracing them in supposedly secularised contexts. In this way we have countered the 
modern tendency to see religion as a separate sphere of human behaviour, or as a distinctive 
way of experiencing reality that depends on the decision to attribute religious meaning to it. 
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This overtly theological approach is often criticized as ‘colonialism writ large’, as subjecting 
modern reality to the categories of a religious tradition, which has become foreign to it since 
secularisation. However, views on the relation of religion to modern secularisation and 
rationalisation are strongly debated.  
 
To clarify this, we return to Max Weber, because we seem to be living in the world he 
predicted at the beginning of the twentieth century.12 Our culture is thoroughly rationalised. 
There is no encompassing worldview, religious or otherwise, giving meaning and coherence 
to reality and human life as a part of it, nor do people feel a need for such a worldview. They 
see and evaluate their lives in terms of ends they want to achieve and the means available to 
get to these ends. This is what Weber calls ‘rationalisation’. This rationalisation of our lives in 
terms of means and ends has brought us a historically unique level of prosperity, has given us 
a life expectancy previously unknown and has brought cultural goods formerly reserved for 
the elite within the reach of many. 
 
At the same time, contemporary societies are characterised by a high level of dissatisfaction 
and frustration. In the midst of rationality and prosperity, people experience a fundamental 
lack and long for a life that is good in a way that cannot be captured in terms of using rational 
means to achieve a reachable end. It is very difficult for them to articulate and discuss what 
this good life is, and one could argue that this is the major crisis of the contemporary Western 
culture. In Max Weber’s analysis, modern society thus becomes an ‘iron cage’ that calls forth 
the will to escape, but from which such an escape is impossible.  
 
We would like to argue that this situation accounts for the present religious situation. On the 
one hand – and contrary to some influential opinions – there is a continuing secularisation, 
understood as the growing insignificance of traditional religious beliefs for society and the 
increasing irrelevance for individuals. On the other hand, there is a return or resurgence of the 
religious in unexpected forms and ways, and a social, existential and intellectual turn to 
religion and religious traditions in the human search for guidance, identity and understanding. 
This shows how much theological topics remain current in modern, rationalised societies.13 
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Questions about where we are going, who we are and how we can deal with the trials and 
tribulations in our personal histories gather a new momentum in societies that become ever 
more rationalised structures in which individuals are on their own in finding a way of life that 
satisfies both their needs and longings. 
 
The problem is that although theological questions remain relevant in modernity, or even 
become relevant anew, they cannot be decided in the same way as questions about scientific 
truths are decided.  To Weber, this means that the rational thing to do is to negotiate a 
compromise between groups committed to different value systems, worldviews, metaphysical 
or religious convictions.14 Against Weber, Jürgen Habermas has argued in a number of 
publications following September 11, 2001, that for a democratic society to remain vital there 
is the need to truly discuss the fundamental orientations of its citizens. In Habermas’ view, 
modern democratic societies depend on the commitment of their people to find the best way 
forward by arguing about all the possible views and options. For Habermas this implies the 
necessity of bringing religious convictions into the public discussion.15   
 
Contrary to Weber’s view, which has become dominant in modernity, religious convictions 
are not arbitrary, unsubstantiated and authoritarian truth claims. Religious traditions present 
views on what is at stake in the reality we live in, applying a rationality, which differs from 
the instrumental rationalisation in de Weberian sense. Studying religions as value systems, as 
changing and developing ways in which people give meaning to their existence, as clusters of 
formulas and rituals that help to cope with suffering and trauma, is necessary and important, 
but fundamentally does not do them justice. To do justice to religions, they should be 
presented as what they claim to be: traditions of justifiable forms of understanding the world 
and human existence, in relation to and in discussion with other forms of understanding in our 
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current situation – be they theoretical, or practical, or both as is the case in the practice of 
medicine.  
 
In other words, religious studies are not only the future of theology, theology is also the future 
of religious studies.  
 
 e. Theology as the future of religious studies 
 
To conclude.  
 
The unique relevance of religion to people in the contemporary situation relates to its ability 
to help them order and understand reality in ways that go beyond the iron cage-rationalisation 
that characterises life in contemporary society. The intellectual relevance of religion in the 
contemporary situation relates to its ability to argue for these alternative ways to view reality 
and our collective and individual relation to it. The existential relevance of religion relates to 
the fact that is it shows that reality demands commitment and choice.  
 
In this situation, what is of major importance is not only to describe religion or religious 
behaviour, although that is needed, and not only to understand it in terms of predetermined 
forms of what counts as rationality in our culture, although that can be helpful. What is 
especially needed is to test the relevance, the pertinence and both the analytical and critical-
transforming power of the particular religious rationality. This rationality is summarised by 
the classical adagio to approach everything sub ratione Dei, which is the definition of 
theology.  
 
In our brief description on our research on theology in medicine, we have shown how such a 
theological approach could open our contemporary culture in new and unexpected ways. 
Ways in which the practice of theology is not a kind of “colonialism writ small” because its 
subject matter is removed from its lived, societal contexts, as Peter Ochs suggests, but in 
which the subject matter of theology is precisely located in the lived, societal contexts. As 
indicated before, we are convinced that in this way we do not only enhance theology’s 
cultural relevance, but also help Christina theology to find its incarnational authenticity (O. 
Davies).  
